Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment
This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence-based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is efficient. In contrast, the use of a 2-factor FA scheme based on sales and capital combined with a residence-based capital tax leads to an inefficient outcome. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
Year of publication: |
2003
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Authors: | Eggert, Wolfgang ; Schjelderup, Guttorm |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 5.2003, 2, p. 439-446
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
Saved in:
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