symposium articles: Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection

The paper analyzes an economy with two-sided adverse selection, focusing on equilibria that satisfy a refinement based on the notion of strategic stability. In the familiar case of one-sided adverse selection, agents reveal all of their private information as long as the contract space is rich enough. However, with two-sided adverse selection, the sufficient conditions for separation are much stronger.

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Year of publication:	2001-05-08
Authors:	Gale, Douglas
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 18.2001, 2, p. 391-414
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Signaling \| Adverse selection \| Markets \| Rationing \| Types \| Equilibrium \| Refinement \| Strategic stability \| Walrasian

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: September 3, 1999; revised version: December 3, 1999
Classification:	D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596818