Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Vasconcelos, Helder |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 36.2005, 1, p. 39-62
|
Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Subject: | Market Structure and Pricing: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection Mergers | Acquisitions | Restructuring | Voting | Proxy Contests | Corporate Governance Market Structure | Firm Strategy | and Market Performance: Monopoly | Monopolization Strategies (cartels | collusion) Market Structure | and Market Performance: Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets | monopolistic competition | contestable markets Collusion | Firm | Firms | Merger | Shares |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Classification: | D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets |
Source: |
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