Tacit Collusion in Price-Setting Duopoly Markets: Experimental Evidence with Complements and Substitutes

We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence is found in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in contrast with a previous study that observes tacit collusion in two treatments with similar underlying demand structures but with no market framing.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Anderson, Lisa R. ; Freeborn, Beth A. ; Holt, Charles A.
Published in:	Southern Economic Journal. - Southern Economic Association - SEA. - Vol. 76.2010, 3, p. 577-591
Publisher:	Southern Economic Association - SEA

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C9 - Design of Experiments ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497876