Take-it-or-leave-it offers in negotiations : behavioral types and endogenous deadlines
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Özyurt, Selçuk |
Published in: |
Journal of economic psychology : research in economic psychology and behavioral economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-4870, ZDB-ID 865181-4. - Vol. 95.2023, p. 1-8
|
Subject: | Bilateral bargaining | Deadline effect | Reputational bargaining | War of attrition | Continuous-time games | Behavioral types | Exit threat | Endogenous deadline | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
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