Takeover Auctions with Actively Participating Targets

This paper provides an analysis of takeover auctions in which target firms actively participate by changing their reserve prices. It considers a takeover auction as an affiliated-value English auction with flexible reserve price and discusses how the degree of value affiliation affects the bidding strategies and the degree of competition in takeover auctions. It makes comparative analysis of three different designs of English auctions and shows that a takeover auction is dominated by one of the English auctions with fixed reserve price

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Khoroshilov, Yuri ; Dodonova, Anna
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com] ; Abstract [doi.org]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 293-311, 2007 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 31, 2006 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.301371 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D44 - Auctions ; G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120051