Takeover Bids and Target Shareholder Protection : The Regulatory Framework in the United Kindom, United States and Australia

This article examines the phenomenon of corporate acquisitions and regulatory responses in the United Kingdom, United States, and Australia. Comapred to the U.K. and Australia, the U.S. follwos a no-holds-barred apporach toward tender offers and targe defensive actions. The current position of these jurisdictions reflects the existing regulatory framework. The U.K. regulatory system seeks to maximize shareholder decision-making, i.e. shareholder having the final say on a bid. Furthermore, the U.K. system requires any offer to be for all of the targets' outstanding shares unless express approval of the regulatory body has been obtained. The U.S. resonse aims ate ensuring an acquisitions in excess of twenty percent of targets' shareholding as a means of ensuring equal treatment and equal opportunity amongst targe shareholders. The U.K. approach is by far the superior, as it ensures equal treatment of all target shareholders and eliminates the need for counterproductive target management defensive actions