Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare Analysis
Existing theory suggests that, in an unregulated market for corporate control, the level of takeovers is suboptimal because shareholders do not receive the full benefit from them. However, existing theory neglects that the threat of takeover may divert managerial effort from productive to defensive activities. This paper shows that, when this is considered, takeovers may, in fact, be excessive.
Year of publication: |
2001
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chakraborty, Atreya ; Arnott, Richard |
Published in: |
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. - Cambridge University Press. - Vol. 36.2001, 03, p. 311-334
|
Publisher: |
Cambridge University Press |
Description of contents: | Abstract [journals.cambridge.org] |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Takeover defenses and dilution : a welfare analysis
Chakraborty, Atreya, (2001)
-
Chakraborty, Atreya, (2001)
-
Takeover Defenses and Dilution: A Welfare Analysis
Chakraborty, Atreya, (1997)
- More ...