Taking Advice from Imperfectly Informed Lobbyists: When to Match Hawks with Hawks
Year of publication: |
2000-02-03
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Authors: | Frisell, Lars |
Institutions: | Economics Institute for Research (SIR), Handelshögskolan i Stockholm |
Subject: | Heterogeneous vs. homogeneous panels | informational efficiency | reputation | external forces |
Extent: | application/pdf application/postscript |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance Number 355 22 pages |
Classification: | D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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Visser, Bauke, (2005)
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Visser, Bauke, (2005)
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Frisell, Lars, (2003)
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