Task divisions in teams with complementary tasks
Year of publication: |
September 2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gregor, Martin |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 117.2015, p. 102-120
|
Subject: | Gift exchange | Complementarity | Public good | Cash transfer | Sequential game | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Experiment | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Öffentliche Sozialleistungen | Social security benefits | Austauschtheorie | Social exchange theory | Anforderungsprofil | Occupational profile | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game |
-
Reciprocal Reactions to (In)Transparent Task Assignments : An Experimental Investigation
Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, (2021)
-
Reciprocal Reactions to (In)transparent Task Assignments : An Experimental Investigation
Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde, (2021)
-
Leading with(out) sacrifice? : a public-goods experiment with a super-additive player
Glöckner, Andreas, (2009)
- More ...
-
Access fees for competing lobbies
Gregor, Martin, (2014)
-
Corporate lobbying: A review of the recent literature
Gregor, Martin, (2011)
-
The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers
Gregor, Martin, (2011)
- More ...