Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context

In a dynamic optimisation framework we show that the optimal tax evasion can be either a positive or a negative function of the tax rate according to the form of the fine to be paid when evasion is detected.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Levaggi, Rosella ; Menoncin, Francesco
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 1, p. 318-321
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Tax evasion \| Dynamic optimisation \| Tax rates \| Audit process \| Optimal dynamic consumption

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G11 - Portfolio Choice ; H26 - Tax Evasion
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580518