Tax Competition Reconsidered
In a classic model of tax competition, this paper shows that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | DHILLON, AMRITA ; WOODERS, MYRNA ; ZISSIMOS, BEN |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 9.2007, 3, p. 391-423
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Publisher: |
Association for Public Economic Theory - APET |
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