Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms
A model of tax competition in which firms earn rents is described. The size of these rents, coupled with the degree to which the firms are foreign-owned, determine the equilibrium tax rates. The existence of rents significantly alters some generally accepted results involving the possibility of a Pareto-improving common tax rate and the underprovision of publicly provided goods.
Year of publication: |
2005-01
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Authors: | Burbidge, John ; Cuff, Katherine ; Leach, John |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of Waterloo |
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