Technological Standards with Local Externalities and Decentralized Behavior

We model a situation in which agents must choose between two technologies that operate under local, positive network externalities. We find that decentralized behavior can lead to the emergence of a technical standard but can also result in a variety of other equilibria. Policy to eliminate non-standardized equilibria can be effected, but in some cases it may be very costly

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Cowan, Robin ; Miller, John H.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Standardisierung \| Standardization
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Check Google Scholar |

More access options

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D2 - Production and Organizations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014215527