This study explores the effects on social coverage of services that will potentially be brought about as a result of Mexico's recent Telecommunications Reform (2013). Specifically, the Reform: (a) aims to introduce regulation to intensify competition, in order to bridge the market efficiency gap; (b) proposes an important shift in policy on digital inclusion, with the aim of bridging the access gap. It thus represents the most significant shake-up of the telecommunications industry in the last 20 years, ever since the privatization of public telecommunications firm Telmex (1990) and the ratification of the Federal Telecommunications Act (1995). The pivotal goals of the Reform are: (1) to encourage competition; (2) to strengthen institutions to that end; and (3) to provide universal access to broadband Internet. The Reform includes measures to encourage competition in the telecommunications sector by way of a new institutional framework in which regulatory institutions are strengthened and a new Federal Telecommunications Institute (IFT) is set up, with the power and autonomy to regulate competition in these marketplaces, in addition to the creation of specialist tribunals and an amendment to the amparo law to prevent any immediate injunction over the regulator’s rulings. This is in addition to encourage foreign investment by allowing 100% investment in the telecoms sector. To foster digital inclusion, the Reform includes provision for the deployment of two new state-administered network backbones with the aim of boosting competition in the interconnection service marketplace and making it easier for relative small local operators to access enhanced 700MHz-band and fiber-optic infrastructure. As of 2014 it is a little early to assess the impact of the Reform in terms of coverage and take-up of telecoms services. Nonetheless, we review the progress of relevant processes and infer the likely impact that the Reform will have on social coverage. Policies on market competition: we aim to examine the methodology and criteria used to define which are the relevant telecommunications service markets, and to identify the dominant operators in those relevant markets that IFT may act upon by imposing asymmetric regulation around service quality, pricing, infrastructure (unbundled access to the network) and functional and structural separation, and potentially calling for the divestment of assets, to prevent anti-competitive behavior. Pricing: as a result of increased competition, we take analyze the trends observed in the pricing of both, intermediary services (interconnection or dedicated links) provided by the dominant operators, and services to end-users. Investment: we determine whether there are any changes in investment flows on the part of existing operators and newcomers to the market as a result of the new regulation, as well as determining whether these fluctuations are greater than trends observed over the past decade. Digital inclusion: we assess the progress of processes involved in the deployment of network backbones, the proposed strategy for building a shared network between cable TV providers and local mobile service providers. In particular, we assess the shift in emphasis of public policy, now focused on provision of infrastructure, and the extent to which this policy actually reaches areas lacking provision. We assess the state of coordination between the various government offices responsible for the sites where broadband Internet access is to be provided. Finally, we examine the supervision mechanisms and means of imposing sanctions in the case of breaches of the requirements set out in the Reform. The proposed methodology for examining and assessing the state of the Reform's implementation is based on an analysis of official information published in trade journals and by government offices, in addition to in-depth interviews with IFT officials and experts involved in drawing up the Reform, along with representatives from the major telecoms companies