Tempting righteous citizens? Counterintuitive effects of increasing sanctions in the realm of organized crime

This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanction for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal–agent model with different kinds of crime that is typical of organized crime. The intuition for the finding is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Friehe, Tim
Published in:	Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics). - Elsevier, ISSN 2214-8043. - Vol. 44.2013, C, p. 37-40
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Crime \| Principal–agent relation \| Information rent

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010666068