Terminal Ranking Games

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrodinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players' welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy

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Year of publication:	2020
Authors:	Bayraktar, Erhan
Other Persons:	Zhang, Yuchong (contributor)
Publisher:	[2020]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Ranking-Verfahren \| Ranking method \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Universitäre Forschung \| University research \| Sozialisation \| Socialization \| Kritik \| Criticism \| Leistungsmotivation \| Work motivation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (22 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Forthcoming, Mathematics of Operations Research Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 23, 2019 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3409540 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012848819