Terrorism, Bargaining, and Credible Commitments
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Young, Joseph K. ; Findley, Michael |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Terrorismus | Terrorism | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Glaubwürdigkeit | Credibility |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (40 p) |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2009 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.1516581 [DOI] |
Classification: | D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H56 - National Security and War |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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