Testable Restrictions of Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Domains
This paper studies the falsiability of the hypothesis of Nash behavoir, for the case of a finite number of players who choose from continuous domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative. Assuming the observation of finite data sets, and using weak, but non-trivial, requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypotesis is falsifiable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restrictions. An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by observed data. Without further specif assumptions, there do not exist harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be sufficient.Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be cooperating so as to attain Pareto-efficient outcomes is impossible, as this behavior is in itself unfalsifiable with finite data sets. Imposing aggregation, or strategic complementary and/or substitutability, if theoretically plausible, may provide for a harsher test.
Authors: | Carvajal, Andrés |
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Institutions: | Banco de la Republica de Colombia |
Subject: | Game theory | testable restrictions | revealed preferences |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Classification: | C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489400
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