Testing Employment Determination in Unionised Economies as a Repeated Game.
This paper is an empirical analysis of alternative bargaining theories of wage and employment determination. Using data from manufacturing sectors of the Spanish economy, the authors find that unions and firms are not myopic and take dynamic considerations into account in the bargaining process. This work is an empirical test of the bargaining model in M. P. Espinosa and C. Rhee (1989) and provides support for their conclusions. Copyright 1997 by Scottish Economic Society.
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | De la Rica, Sara ; Espinosa, Maria Paz |
Published in: |
Scottish Journal of Political Economy. - Scottish Economic Society - SES. - Vol. 44.1997, 2, p. 134-52
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Publisher: |
Scottish Economic Society - SES |
Saved in:
freely available
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