Testing the tax competition theory : how elastic are national tax bases in OECD countries?

To what extent do countries' corporate income tax (CIT) rates attract foreign tax bases? What are the revenue implications of a unilateral tax reduction when tax bases are internationally mobile? These questions are explored using a panel of annual data from 17 OECD countries spanning the period 1982 to 2005. We find significant international fiscal externalities in the form of CIT-induced resource flows. The magnitude, however, indicates that the extent of international corporate tax base mobility is rather modest. Moreover, we find that, on average, a unilateral CIT reduction results in a less-than-proportional increase in the CIT base, thus reducing CIT revenues. The results are robust across a wide range of specifications and point to potential gains from international tax policy coordination. -- tax competition ; corporate income tax base elasticity ; instrumental variables ; international fiscal externalities ; Laffer curve ; panel data estimation