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Testing Whether Field Auction Experiments are Demand Revealing in Practice

Recent evidence suggests that participants’ misunderstanding of experimental auction mechanisms can systematically bias auction results. We present a simple technique for testing whether field auction participants fully understand the demand-revealing nature of the auction mechanism and, by extension, whether auction bids provide an unbiased estimate of participants’ willingness to pay.
Year of publication:
2008-08
Authors: Corrigan, Jay R. ; Rousu, Matthew C.
Institutions: Economics Department, Kenyon College
Subject: demand revealing | experimental auctions | field experiments
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application/pdf
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Type of publication: Book / Working Paper
Classification: B41 - Economic Methodology ; D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis ; D44 - Auctions
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998546
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