The allocation of future business : dynamic relational contracts with multiple agents
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
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Authors: | Andrews, Isaiah ; Barron, Daniel |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 106.2016, 9, p. 2742-2759
|
Subject: | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Allokationseffizienz | Allocative efficiency | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Theorie | Theory |
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