The Allocation of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention

Online-Ressource (IX, 163 p)

online resource

1 The Entrepreneur in Economic TheoryA Brief History -- Entrepreneurial Limitations -- Implications of Limited Entrepreneurial Attention -- Conclusion -- References -- 2 Limited Attention -- Limited Attention in Organizations -- Limited Attention in Economic Models -- Conclusion -- References -- 3 Allocating Limited Entrepreneurial Attention -- The Basic Model -- The Optimal Policy -- General Results -- Variations on the Basic Model -- Conclusion -- References -- 4 Innovation, Firm Size And Growth -- Related Literature -- The Schumpeterian Hypothesis -- Optimal R&D -- Extensions -- Conclusion -- References -- 5 Career Choice -- The Implications of the Model -- Conclusion -- References -- 6 Optimally Incomplete Contracts -- Related Literature -- Incomplete Contracts -- Conclusion -- References -- 7 The Internalization Of Transactions -- Related Literature -- Internal versus Market Transactions -- Asset Specificity and Opportunism -- Transaction Costs and Firm Size -- Endogenous Transaction Costs -- Evolution to Market Transactions -- Conclusion -- References -- 8 The Role Of The Venture Capitalist -- Related Literature -- The Venture Capitalist’s Optimal Allocation -- Entry of Venture Capitalists -- General Partner and Limited Partners -- Investments in Later Stage Ventures -- Socially Optimal Consultation -- Empirical Evidence -- Alternative Formulations -- Conclusion -- References -- 9 Independent Contractors -- Bilateral P-A and Common Agency Models -- The Entrepreneurial Agent -- Conclusion -- References -- 10 Conclusion -- Further Applications -- Extensions -- References -- References -- Name Index.

10.1007/978-1-4615-5605-3 [DOI]

ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW