The art of making everybody happy: how to prevent a secession
Year of publication: |
2001-03
|
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Authors: | LE BRETON, Michel ; WEBER, Shlomo |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | transfer schemes | secession | migration | efficiency | stability |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 2001011 |
Classification: | D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; H20 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue. General ; H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects |
Source: |
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Heterogeneity gap in stable juridiction structures
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Heterogeneity gap in stable jurisdiction structures
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The Art of Making Everybody Happy: how to Prevent a Secession.
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