The asymptotic strategyproofness of scoring and condorcet consistent rules
Eyal Baharad; Zvika Neeman
| Year of publication: |
2002
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Baharad, Eyal ; Neeman, Zvika |
| Published in: |
Review of economic design : RED. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1434-4742, ZDB-ID 1409550-6. - Vol. 7.2002, 3, p. 331-340
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| Subject: | Condorcet-Paradoxon | Paradox of voting | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Notes: | In: Review of economic design |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001736526