The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
We present a unified framework for a broad class of values in transferable utility games with coalition structure, including the Owen coalitional value and two weighted versions with weights given by the size of the coalitions. We provide three axiomatic characterizations using the properties of Efficiency, Linearity, Independence of Null Coalitions, and Coordination, with two versions of Balanced Contributions inside a Coalition and Weighted Sharing in Unanimity Games, respectively.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Gómez-Rúa, María ; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
Published in: |
European Journal of Operational Research. - Elsevier, ISSN 0377-2217. - Vol. 207.2010, 2, p. 795-806
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Coalition structure Coalitional value Axiomatic approach |
Saved in:
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