The bank closure policy and the optimal incentive contract for self-interested regulators
Year of publication: |
2003
|
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Authors: | Chen, Yehning ; Chang, Chu-hsuan |
Published in: |
Research in banking and finance. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : JAI, ISSN 1567-7915, ZDB-ID 2060851-2. - Vol. 3.2003, p. 147-163
|
Subject: | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Bankinsolvenz | Bank failure | Liquidation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Theorie | Theory |
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