The case for a monetary rule in a constitutional democracy
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Hetzel, Robert L. |
Published in: |
Economic quarterly. - Richmond, Va. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1069-7225, ZDB-ID 1308421-5. - Vol. 83.1997, 2, p. 45-65
|
Subject: | Geldpolitik | Monetary policy | Demokratie | Democracy | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Zentralbankunabhängigkeit | Central bank independence | Verfassung | Constitution | Inflationssteuer | Inflation tax | Münzgewinn | Seigniorage | Theorie | Theory | USA | United States | 1950-1995 |
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