The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating
Year of publication: |
2005-09
|
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Authors: | Guha, Brishti |
Institutions: | School of Economics, Singapore Management University |
Subject: | Moral hazard | firm size | managerial compensation | repeated games |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Published in SMU Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series Number 16-2005 32 pages |
Classification: | D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development |
Source: |
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The Case of the Errant Executive : Management, Control and Firm Size in Corporate Cheating
Guha, Brishti, (2005)
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