The Chaos of 12 U.S.C. Section 1821(K) : Congressional Subsidizing of Negligent Bank Directors and Officers?

Relieving bank managers from traditional liability for negligence is contrary to the legislative and executive intent in passing FIRREA and economically suboptimal. Misinterpreting FIRREA to permit negligent management of banks will create perverse incentives for excessive bank risks and lead to more taxpayer funded bank bailouts that could impose trillions in costs

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ramirez, Steven A.
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Bank \| Subvention \| Subsidy \| Chaostheorie \| Chaos theory \| Kanada \| Canada

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (66 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Fordham Law Review, Vol. 65, p. 625, 1996 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 15, 1995 erstellt
Classification:	e53 ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139645