The choice of agrarian contracts in early renaissance Tuscany : risk sharing, moral hazard, or capital market imperfections
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Ackerberg, Daniel A. ; Botticini, Maristella |
Published in: |
Explorations in economic history : EEH. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0014-4983, ZDB-ID 401138-7. - Vol. 37.2000, 3, p. 241-257
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Subject: | Toskana | Tuscany | Landpacht | Land rental | Risiko | Risk | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Finanzmarkt | Financial market | Unvollkommener Markt | Incomplete market | Agrargeschichte | Agricultural history | 1427 |
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