The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices

I study the evolution of reciprocity in a gift-exchange game. In equilibrium, wage offers induce maximal effort but there is strong inequity in favor of the workers. The result suggests that norm-based efficiency wages may be unstable over time.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Schliffke, Philipp
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 117.2012, 1, p. 326-329
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Reciprocity \| Gift-exchange \| Indirect evolution \| Efficiency wages

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods ; D - Microeconomics ; J - Labor and Demographic Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010580454