The Complexity of Resource Allocation and Price Mechanisms under Bounded Rationality.
We develop a framework for designing and evaluating the complexity of mechanisms that allocate resources in a distributed setting to agents or processors with bounded computational ability. We discuss several mechanisms and describe the construction of efficient price based mechanisms, which exploit the decentralized aspects of the problem. These price mechanisms are polynomial in the number of resources, precision of the solution, and the logarithm of the number of agents.
Year of publication: |
1995
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Authors: | Friedman, Eric J ; Oren, Shmuel S |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 6.1995, 2, p. 225-50
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
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