The Complier Pays Principle : The Limits of Fiscal Approaches toward Sustainable Forest Management
Year of publication: |
2000
|
---|---|
Authors: | Leruth, Luc E. |
Other Persons: | Ruzicka, I. (contributor) ; Leruth, Luc E. (contributor) ; Paris, R. (contributor) |
Publisher: |
Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Forstpolitik | Forest policy | Forstökonomie | Forest economics | Regenwald | Rainforest |
Extent: | Online-Ressource (28 p) |
---|---|
Series: | IMF working papers. - Washington, DC : IMF, ZDB-ID 2108494-4. - Vol. Working Paper No. 00/51 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
ISBN: | 1-4518-4710-6 ; 978-1-4518-4710-9 |
Other identifiers: | 10.5089/9781451847109.001 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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