The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games (*)
For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.
Year of publication: |
1996
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Authors: | Manelli, Alejandro M. |
Published in: |
Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 7.1996, 2, p. 323-335
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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