The Core and the Equal Division Core in a Three-Person Unstructured Bargaining Experiment : The Weakest Coalition is Ignored
Year of publication: |
[2022]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Shinoda, Taro ; Funaki, Yukihiko |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Core | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
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