The core of a housing market with externalities

It is known that the core of a housing market always exists and contains a unique matching when agents have independent preferences. We show that when preferences of agents are interdependent, there are housing markets with an empty core as well as housing markets with a core containing more than one matching.

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Year of publication:	2007-11-07
Authors:	Saglam, Ismail ; Mumcu, Ayse
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 57, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	core

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010630166