The Core of Large TU Games

For non-atomic TU games nu satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of nu. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(nu) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of $\nu $. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.

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Year of publication:	2000-04
Authors:	Epstein, Larry G. ; Marinacci, Massimo
Institutions:	University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER)
Subject:	core \| transferable utility \| non atomic game

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	RCER Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 469 41 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005200773