The Costs and Benefits of a Separation of Powers--An Incomplete Contracts Approach
The separation of the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers is a key principle in most democratic constitutions. We analyze the costs and benefits of separating legislature and executive in an incomplete contracts model: the executive can decide to implement public projects. Under separation of powers, the legislature sets up a decision-making framework that leaves the executive with the residual decision-making rights. Separation of powers is the more beneficial, the larger the danger of extreme policy preferences of the residual political decision maker. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Fuchs, Kira ; Herold, Florian |
Published in: |
American Law and Economics Review. - Oxford University Press. - Vol. 13.2011, 1, p. 131-167
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Publisher: |
Oxford University Press |
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