The Credibility of Monetary Policy Announcements: Empirical Evidence for OECD Countries since the 1960s
Monetary policy rules have been considered as fundamental protection against inflation. However, empirical evidence for a correlation between rules and inflation is relatively weak. In this paper, we first discuss likely causes for this weak link and present the argument that monetary commitment is not credible in itself. It can grant price stability best if it is backed by an adequate assignment of economic policy. An empirical assessment based on panel data covering five decades and 22 OECD countries confirms the crucial role of a credibly backed monetary commitment to price stability.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Belke, Ansgar ; Freytag, Andreas ; Keil, Jonas ; Schneider, Friedrich |
Institutions: | DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) |
Subject: | credibility | central bank independence | price stability | monetary commitment |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin. - ISSN 1619-4535. |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 1225 23 pages long |
Classification: | E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation ; E50 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking and the Supply of Money and Credit. General ; E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects) |
Source: |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896170