The curse of long horizons
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Bhaskar, V. ; Mailath, George J. |
Published in: |
Journal of mathematical economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0304-4068, ZDB-ID 217625-7. - Vol. 82.2019, p. 74-89
|
Subject: | Differences in beliefs | High-powered incentives | Moral hazard | Principal-agency | Moral Hazard | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives |
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