The Design of Bank Loan Contracts, Collateral, and renegotiation.

We study a model of renegotiation between a borrower and lender in which there is the potential for moral hazard on each side of the relationship.

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Gorton, G. ; Khan, J.
Institutions:	Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research, Wharton School of Business
Subject:	RISK \| CONTRACTS \| FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

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Series:	Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	37 pages
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D89 - Information and Uncertainty. Other ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245262