The design of first-price debt auction when the winning bidder can install capacity that can be expanded or contracted later
Year of publication: |
2023
|
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Authors: | Jou, Jyh-Bang |
Published in: |
The European journal of finance. - London [u.a.] : Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1466-4364, ZDB-ID 2001610-4. - Vol. 29.2023, 5, p. 527-541
|
Subject: | Bankruptcy | contract | debt auction | down payment | expand | first-price Auction | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Vertrag | Contract | Auktion | Auction |
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