The determinants of the voting premium in Italy: The evidence from 1974 to 2003
We examine the voting premium in Italy in the period 1974 to 2003, when it ranged from 1% to 100%. At firm level, the measure of the price differential between voting and non-voting stocks cannot be fully explained without taking into account the effect of the largest shareholder's identity. Family-controlled firms have higher voting premiums, especially when the family owns a large stake in the company's voting equity and the founder is the firm's CEO and/or Chairman. We explain this result by showing that families attach greater importance to control and are more prone than other types of controlling shareholders to expropriate the non-voting class of shareholders.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Caprio, Lorenzo ; Croci, Ettore |
Published in: |
Journal of Banking & Finance. - Elsevier, ISSN 0378-4266. - Vol. 32.2008, 11, p. 2433-2443
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Non-voting shares Voting premium Dual-class share firms Family Italy |
Saved in:
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