The Dreze and Grossman-Hart criteria for production in incomplete markets: Voting foundations and compared political stability
Year of publication: |
2004-03-01
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Authors: | CRES, Hervé ; TVEDE, Mich |
Institutions: | HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) |
Subject: | incomplete markets | super majority voting | sidepayments | corporate charter | self-fulfilling prophcies |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 794 22 pages |
Classification: | D21 - Firm Behavior ; D52 - Incomplete Markets ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; G39 - Corporate Finance and Governance. Other |
Source: |
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Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent
CRES, Herve, (2001)
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Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
CRES, Herve, (2001)
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Voting in Assemblies of Shareholders and Incomplete Markets
Tvede, Mich, (2004)
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Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets
CRES, Herve, (2001)
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Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent
CRES, Herve, (2001)
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Portfolio diversification and internalization of production externalities through majority voting
Crès, Hervé, (2006)
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