The dynamic evolution of preferences

Aviad Heifetz, Chris Shannon and Yossi Spiegel

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed.

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Year of publication:	2005
Other Persons:	Heifetz, Aviad (contributor) ; Shannon, Chris (contributor) ; Spiegel, Yossi (contributor)
Publisher:	Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	Online Ressource, (36 S.)
Series:	Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University. - Evanston, Ill. : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ZDB-ID 2186959-5. - Vol. 1415
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/31223 [Handle]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003780865