The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism
We consider truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in an independent private-value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We propose a suitable generalization of the pivot mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent. In the dynamic pivot mechanism, the ex post incentive and ex post participation constraints are satisfied for all agents after all histories. In an environment with diverse preferences it is the unique mechanism satisfying ex post incentive, ex post participation, and efficient exit conditions. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Bergemann, Dirk ; Juuso V‰lim‰ki |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 78.2010, 2, p. 771-789
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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