The Economic theory of agrarian institutions

Intro -- Contents -- Contributors -- I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION -- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development -- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics -- II. LAND AND LABOUR -- 3. Theories of Sharecropping -- 4. A Comparison of Principal-Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts -- 5. Contracts with Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal-Agent Relationships -- 6. Production Relations in Semi-arid African Agriculture -- III. CREDIT AND INTERLINKED TRANSACTIONS -- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency -- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure -- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality -- 10. On Choice among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts -- 11.Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts among Risk-neutral Agents -- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements -- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition -- IV. MARKETING AND INSURANCE -- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization -- 15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts -- V. CO-OPERATIVES, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE STATE -- 16. Agricultural Producer Co-operatives -- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co-operatives -- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.