Recommended readings (Machine generated): 1. Claude d'Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979), 'Incentives and Incomplete Information', Journal of Public Economics, 11 (1), February, 25-45 -- 2. Jerry Green and Jean-Jacques Laffont (1977), 'Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods', Econometrica, 45 (2), March, 427-38 -- 3. Theodore Groves (1973), 'Incentives in Teams', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 617-31 -- 4. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1979), 'A Differential Approach to Expected Utility Maximizing Mechanisms', in Jean-Jacques Laffont (ed.), Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences: Studies in Public Economics Volume 2, Part IV, Chapter 16, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, New York, NY, USA and Oxford, UK: North-Holland Publishing Company, 289-308 -- 5. Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric Maskin (1980), 'A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms', Econometrica, 48 (6), September, 1507-20 -- 6. George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite (1990), 'Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 351-67 -- 7. Allan Gibbard (1973), 'Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result', Econometrica, 41 (4), July, 587-601 -- 8. Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond and Eric Maskin (1979), 'The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility', Review of Economic Studies, 46 (2), April, 185-216 -- 9. Roger B. Myerson (1979), 'Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem', Econometrica, 47 (1), January, 61-73 -- 10. Roger B. Myerson (1982), 'Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems', Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10 (1), June, 67-81 -- 11. Joel S. Demski and David Sappington (1984), 'Optimal Incentive Contracts with Multiple Agents', Journal of Economic Theory, 33 (1), June 152-71 -- 12. Eric Maskin (1999), 'Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 23-38 -- 13. Eric Maskin and John Moore (1999), 'Implementation and Renegotiation', Review of Economic Studies, Special Issue: Contracts, 66 (1), January, 39-56 -- 14. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1988), 'Subgame Perfect Implementation', Econometrica, 56 (5), September, 1191-1220 -- 15. John Moore and Rafael Repullo (1990), 'Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization', Econometrica, 58 (5), September, 1083-99 -- 16. Thomas R. Palfrey and Sanjay Srivastava (1989), 'Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies', Econometrica, 57 (1), January, 115-34 -- 17. Dilip Mookherjee and Stefan Reichelstein (1990), 'Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (3), July, 453-75 -- 18. Bengt Holmström and Roger B. Myerson (1983), 'Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information', Econometrica, 51 (6), November, 1799-1819 -- 19. John O. Ledyard and Thomas R. Palfrey (1999), 'A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods', Econometrica, 67 (2), March, 435-48